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In the shadow of the Supreme Court's constitutional federalism
doctrines,1 lower federal courts have developed doctrines of common

1. For recent cases developing constitutional federalism doctrine, see, e.g., Alden v.
Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999) (establishing state sovereign inlmunity from suits brought un
der federal law in state court); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (limiting con
gressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to control state action);
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (forbidding congressional action that co=an
deers state officers); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (forbidding, under
Tenth Amendment, congressional action that co=andeers state legislatures). For general
discussions of federalism doctrine, see, e.g., Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN.
L. REV. 317 (1997); Edward Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism, Some Notes on a Na
tional Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994). On the federalism cases of the Court's most
recent term, see Linda Greenhouse, States Are Given New Legal Shield by Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1999, at Al,("[I]t was also strikingly apparent that the fault line that
runs through the current Court as an all but unbridgeable gulf has to do not with the higher
profile issues of race, religion, abortion, or due process, but with federalism.").
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law federalism through vehicles such as abstention.2 In the environ
mental law arena, courts have employed a number of abstention theo
ries to dismiss citizen suits brought under federal statutes.3 The ap
pearance of primary jurisdiction and Burford abstention in citizen
suits brought under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
("RCRA")4 exemplifies this trend.
In rejecting RCRA suits, some courts have relied on primary juris
diction, a doctrine conceived as a mechanism to allocate responsibility
for limited fact-finding between courts and agencies, to dismiss RCRA
citizen suits. These courts have emphasized the technical nature of
evaluating RCRA violations and the superiority of state agencies as
the bodies to address such issues.5 Although primary jurisdiction often
allows the plaintiff to return to court following agency resolution of
particular issues,6 RCRA dismissals under the doctrine may be so
open-ended that they are effectively final.7 Because RCRA creates an
exclusively federal cause of action,8 dismissals leave citizen plaintiffs
with no judicial forum.

2. Little systematic study has been devoted to how lower federal courts are applying ab
stention doctrines. See Gordon G. Young, Federal Court Abstention and State Administra
tive Law from Burford to Ankenbrandt: Fifty Years ofJudicial Federalism Under Burford v.
Sun Oil and Kindred Doctrines, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 859, 982-83 (1993) (suggesting a longi
tudinal study that would assist the Supreme Court in fashioning abstention doctrine).
3. Other abstention doctrines cropping up in environmental cases generally, but not dis
cussed in this Note, include the Colorado River doctrine, the Pullman doctrine, and Younger
abstention. See William Daniel Benton, Application ofRes Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
to EPA Overfiling, 16 B.C. ENVIL. AFF. L. REV. 199, 270-78 (1988). The Colorado River
doctrine has made a few recent appearances in RCRA suits. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v.
Mobil Corp., No. CIV.A.96CV1781RSP/DNH, 1998 WL 160820, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
1998) (refusing to abstain under Colorado River); Morton College Board of Trustees v.
Town of Cicero, 18 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same). The doctrine's prerequi
sites are so exhaustive, however, that it seems unlikely to become the basis for dismissal of
many future RCRA citizen suits. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817-20 (1976) (requiring parallel state and federal suits and a considera
tion of many factors to justify application of the doctrine).
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq. (West 1997); see also § 6902(b) ("National Policy": "The
Congress hereby declares it to be the national policy of the United States that, wherever fea
sible, the generation of hazardous waste is to be reduced or eliminated as expeditiously as
possible. Waste that is nevertheless generated should be treated, stored, or disposed of so as
to minimize the present and future threat to human health and the environment.").
5. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997-998 (D. Kan.
1997); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349-50
(D.N.M. 1995); Carroll v. Litton Systems, Inc., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 WL 312969, at *209
(W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990).
6.

See Louis L. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1038

(1964).

7. See, e.g., Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997-98. In that case, the federal court declined juris
diction with no specifications about the conditions under which plaintiffs might return to
court. See 963 F. Supp. at 1000. The court did not return the matter to the agency's jurisdic
tion for any factual determinations or pending an agency enforcement proceeding, but
rather deferred generally to the agency's power. See 963 F. Supp. at 1000.
8. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972. The Sixth Circuit recently splintered off from the previously
unanimous view that RCRA's citizen suit causes of action are exclusively federal. See Davis
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Other courts have applied the doctrine of Burford abstention,
which allows federal court dismissal where adjudication would involve
complicated questions of state law or would interfere with a state's at
tempts to develop a regulatory scheme. Although the appellate courts
that have invoked Burford abstention have only addressed suits that
challenged permitting or siting decisions,9 lower courts have applied
the reasoning to abstain from RCRA citizen suits more generally.
District courts using these rulings have extended the use of Burford to
cases where the plaintiffs sought to redress RCRA violations or en
dangering conditions.10 Burford claims have arisen with increasing
frequency in RCRA suits,11 probably because RCRA's jurisdictional
provisions are too clear to allow for disputes about when the statute
precludes a claim.
Courts that have employed these doctrines have ignored the
explicit goals and jurisdictional structure of RCRA. In enacting the
comprehensive statutory and regulatory provisions of RCRA,
Congress adopted a scheme of environmental law with national
minimum standards and provisions for federal court enforcement. To
facilitate judicial oversight, Congress created two federal causes of
action for citizen suits in addition to EPA and state regulatory
enforcement.12 The statute also articulates the limited circumstances
under which a citizen suit is barred: if either the state agency or the
EPA has already commenced an enforcement action regarding the

v. Sun Oil Co. , 148 F. 3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998). This Note rejects this novel approach.
notes 65-79 and accompanying text.

See infra

9. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F. 3d 1188, 1189-90 (6th Cir. 1995)
(plaintiffs claimed that hazardous waste facility was operating without a final permit); Sug
arloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Montgomery County, 3 3 F. 3d 52 (4th Cir. 1994) (unpublished dispo
sition) (plaintiffs challenged issuance of permits for an incinerator facility); Palumbo v.
Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159-60 (4th Cir. 199 3) (same).
10. See Davies, 96 3 F. Supp. at 998-99 (abstaining where state agency had created a re
medial plan, but no court action had been undertaken); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F.
Supp. at 1 347-48 (state agency and defendants had reached stipulated agreement after ad
ministrative proceedings).
11. Burford claims are also raised in suits brought under other federal environmental
statutes. The Fifth Circuit, for example, recently applied Burford in the context of an En
dangered Species Act case. See Sierra Club v. San Antonio, 112 F. 3d 789 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 879 (1998).
12. These causes of action include an enforcement action that encourages private plain
tiffs to fill in enforcement gaps where the EP A or state agency has not noticed or decided
not to pursue an alleged violation, see 42 U. S. C. A. § 6972(a)(l)( A) ("[A]ny person may
commence a civil action on his own behalf-against any person . . . who is alleged to be in
violation of any permit, standard, regulation, condition, requirement, prohibition, or order
which has become effective pursuant to this chapter . . . . "), and where there is an "imminent
and substantial endangerment" cause of action, see § 6972(a)(l)(B) ("against any person . . .
who has contributed . . . to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation,
or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment").
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alleged violation,13 or if plaintiffs are using the citizen suit as a way to
challenge the terms of a permit or a determination as to where a
particular facility will be located.14 These statutory limits determine
precisely when a federal court must dismiss a RCRA citizen suit.
This Note argues that dismissals based on the primary jurisdiction
and Burford abstention doctrines violate the enforcement approach
developed by Congress under RCRA and constitute judicial rule
making beyond the established boundaries of the two doctrines. Part I
argues that the policy concerns underlying the primary jurisdiction
doctrine make it inapplicable for dismissals of RCRA citizen suits be
cause RCRA's statutory scheme depends on federal court oversight,
not agency independence, to ensure uniformity. Part II turns to the
Burford doctrine, describing the local law focus of the doctrine and
demonstrating that the explicitly federally centered statutory scheme
makes RCRA suits inappropriate candidates for Burford abstention.
Part II also asserts that because citizen suits challenging state-issued
permits - the factual setting in which the Fourth and Sixth Circuits
have employed Burford abstention - are outside of the statute's ju
risdictional grant, invocation of Burford in that setting is unnecessary.
Part III addresses the suitability of the primary jurisdiction and Bur
ford doctrines as methods for creating a judicially fashioned theory of
federalism. This Part argues that in the RCRA context, federal court
abstention does not productively further a more state-centered vision
of cooperative federalism. This Note concludes that abstention theo
ries are inappropriate in the context of an expansive federal statutory
scheme, and that, absent constitutional infirmities, policy judgments as
to the wisdom of such federal regulation should be left to Congress.
I.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Primary jurisdiction, often discussed by courts along with the
Burford doctrine in the context of RCRA citizen suits,15 allows a court

13. See § 6972 (b)(l)(B), (b)(2)(B), (C). Courts have consistently interpreted "enforce
ment action" under RCRA as requiring an actual civil penalty action in a court, not simply
agency review or monitoring of possible violations. See Morris v. Primetime Stores of Kan
sas, Inc., No. 95-1328-JTM, 1996 WL 563845, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1996) (interpreting
RCRA); City of Toledo v. Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 656-57 (N.D.
Ohio 1993) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B)).
14.

See § 6976.

15. This Note addresses primary jurisdiction because it has met with some limited suc
cess as a ground for abstention, and because many of its policy goals intertwine with those of
the Burford doctrine. See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 871 (1999) (Posner, C.J.) (defendant's requests for dismissal
based on Burford or primary jurisdiction "amount to the same thing"); James C. Rehnquist,
Taking Comity Seriously: How to Neutralize the Abstention Doctrine, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1076-77 (1994) (factors cited in favor of Burford abstention "virtually identical" to those
cited in favor of primary jurisdiction).
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to allocate jurisdiction between itself and an administrative agency
where the forums share the ability to decide one or more of the issues
at stake in the lawsuit.16 The doctrine,first articulated by the Supreme
Court in Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.,
allows a court either to stay its jurisdiction or to grant a dismissal
pending a hearing before the agency.17
Four policy concerns underlying primary jurisdiction are fre
quently discussed in the RCRA context. As a prerequisite to applying
the primary jurisdiction doctrine, the statutory scheme at issue must
be vague about whether a court or an agency should assume jurisdic
tion over a matter.18 Second, the doctrine is appropriate only where
the relevant legislative body specifically holds an agency responsible
for providing uniform application of a statute,19 or where a statute dic
tates that an agency's particular duties supersede those of the court.20
A court must not defer where the federal judiciary provides the only
guarantee that a federal statutory scheme is uniformly applied.21

16. See Port of Boston Marine Terminal Ass'n v. Rederiaktiebolaget Transatlantic, 400
U.S. 62, 68 (1970) ("[T]his Court [has] recognized . . . that coordination between traditional
judicial machinery and these agencies was necessary . . . . The doctrine of primary jurisdic
tion has become one of the key judicial switches through which this current has passed.").
17. See Sidney A. Shapiro, Abstention and Primary Jurisdiction: Two Chips Offthe Same
Block?-A Comparative Analysis, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 75, 76 {1974). Theoretically, pri
mary jurisdiction allows a court to stay jurisdiction temporarily pending agency resolution of
a specific factual issue, not to avoid adjudication of a suit altogether. In effect, however, the
"stay" might amount to a permanent end to federal court jurisdiction. See Kenneth F.
Hoffman, The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction Misconceived: End to Common Law Envi
ronmental Protection?, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 491, 497 (1974) {discussing case law where
plaintiffs have no remedy once primary jurisdiction is invoked by the federal court).
18. See Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1041 ("It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the statutory
purpose that a specialized administrative tribunal has been created to deal with problems in
a certain area . . . But a grant of power implies a limit, and the simultaneous grant of juris
diction to the courts or a failure to abolish jurisdiction potentially conflicting may indicate
where that limit is.").
19. See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 {1963) (noting that
primary jurisdiction "requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of
a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the
scheme"); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 440-41 {1907)
(federal court judgment might impair Interstate Co=erce Commission's ability to impose
uniform freight rates for co=on carriers, the duty assigned to it by statute).
20. See Keogh v. Chicago & NW Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 156, 162 {1922) {staying jurisdiction
because regulatory powers of the ICC superseded private plaintiff's remedy under the
Sherman Act).
21. Courts are split over whether a federal court may ever defer to a state, rather than to
a federal agency, under primary jurisdiction. In the type of RCRA case relevant to this
Note, where the acting agency is a state body, agency action might never provide the requi
site authority for deferral. Compare County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d
1295, 1310 {2d Cir. 1990) {primary jurisdiction generally unsuitable basis for federal court
deference to jurisdiction of a state administrative agency), and Sierra Club v. United States
DOE, 734 F. Supp. 946, 951 {D. Colo. 1990) (interpreting RCRA, and holding that a federal
court may not defer to a state agency on a matter of federal law), with Friends of Santa Fe
County v. LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349 (D.N.M. 1995) (applying primary ju
risdiction in favor of state agency).
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Third, courts have applied primary jurisdiction where a statute relies
on an agency's technical specialization as a factfinder.22 Finally, pri
mary jurisdiction may cure various problems arising when an agency
and a court share jurisdiction in a way that affects the regulation of a
particular defendant.23 The assessment of each of these concerns turns
on the purposes of the statute and the roles assigned to each govern
mental body acting under it.24
This Part argues that each of these concerns weighs against apply
ing primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suits.25 Section I.A examines
the jurisdictional grant under the statute and demonstrates that this
framework represents a codified system of court/agency roles needing
no further judicial articulation. Section LB argues that the main policy
underlying primary jurisdiction, ensuring the uniform application of a
statute, weighs against the doctrine's application to RCRA suits be
cause RCRA's statutory scheme relies on federal courts, not state
agencies, to provide such uniformity. Section LC rejects the view that
the issue of an agency's technical specialization favors dismissing
RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds because the stat
ute allocates resources for courts to achieve proficiency. Section I.D
concludes that the various issues raised by potentially conflicting court
and agency action do not require the application of primary jurisdic
tion in the RCRA context.
A.

Notice and Preclusion

RCRA's jurisdictional provisions are so specific that they leave the

22. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 303-04 (1976) {discussing appli
cation of primary jurisdiction where an issue "involves technical questions of fact uniquely
within the expertise and experience of an agency such as matters turning on an assessment of
industry conditions" (citations omitted)).
23. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 998 (D. Kan. 1997)
(existence of agency proceedings deemed relevant regarding possible conflicting orders,
venue for plaintiffs, diligence of agency in pursuing action); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892
F. Supp. at 1350 (considering whether agency and court determinations might impose con
flicting obligations on the defendant as part of primary jurisdiction analysis).

24. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D.
Minn. 1995) {doctrine must be consistent with congressional intent underlying the statute);
see also Jaffe, supra note 6, at 1041 (statutory purpose should underlie application of primary
jurisdiction).
25. Primary jurisdiction has been less successful than Burford as a ground for RCRA
citizen suit dismissals. See, e.g., Craig Lyle Ltd., 877 F. Supp. at 483 (primary jurisdiction
generally disfavored for federal citizen suits); Sierra Club, 734 F. Supp. at 950-51; United
States EPA v. Environmental Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp. 1172, 1194-95 (N.D. Ind.
1989), (concluding that application of primary jurisdiction would thwart legislative intent of
RCRA) affd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Wheelabrator Tech. Inc., 725 F. Supp. 758, 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to apply primary
jurisdiction pending EPA review where issue involved statutory construction); Merry v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. 697 F. Supp. 180, 182-83 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that primary
jurisdiction should be invoked sparingly in the citizen suit context).
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federal courts with no opportunity to assert jurisdictional discretion.
This congressional guidance dictates that a federal court must assume
jurisdiction when a citizen suit meets the jurisdictional requirements of
the statute.26
The first jurisdictional limitation allows suit only when notice re
quirements have been met. Citizen plaintiffs must provide notice to
any potential defendant, the EPA, and the state administrative agency
prior to commencing suit.27 This notice mechanism allows the state or
the EPA to prevent a citizen suit altogether by filing its own action
against the defendant28 or by compelling compliance before the citizen
suit can commence.29
The specific window of time in which an alleged violator may cor
rect problems without court involvement defines the role of state
agencies within the context of citizen suits.30 Rather than dismissing a
case under an abstention doctrine in order to allow state participation
in the remedying of violations, federal courts need only ascertain that
the plaintiff has properly complied with the statutory notice provi
sions. Observance of this notice rule guarantees that states have an
opportunity to participate in the cooperative scheme without jeop
ardizing RCRA's mandate for timely remediation of solid and hazard
ous waste violations.31

26. See Trident Inv. Management, Inc. v. Bhambra, No. 95 C 4260, 1995 WL 736940, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1995) (RCRA's statutory terms override co=on law doctrine of pri
mary jurisdiction); Sierra Club, 734 F. Supp. at 951-52 (same); Werlein v. United States, 746
F. Supp 887, 892 n.4 (D. Minn. 1990) (vacated in part on other grounds) (finding RCRA's
jurisdictional limits under 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(B) to be a codification of primary jurisdic
tion). But see Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997-99 (applying primary jurisdiction); Friends ofSanta
Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1348-51 (same).
27. Plaintiffs must provide 60-days notice under the enforcement provision of the stat
ute, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(l)(A) (West 1997), and 90-days notice under the inrminent
endangerment authority, See § 6972(b)(2)(A). Plaintiff must give notice before filing suit.
Effective notice, or the staying of an action pending post-filing notice, is not permitted. See
Hallstrom v. Tallamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29 (1989).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(l)(B) (prohibiting citizen suit where the EPA or state has
filed an enforcement action); Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 ("[N]otice allows Government agen
cies to take responsibility for enforcing environmental regulations, thus obviating the need
for citizen suits.").
29. See Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 29 ("[N]otice gives the alleged violator 'an opportunity to
bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a
citizen suit.' " (citing Gwaltney of Smithfield, Inc. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49, 60 (1987))).
30. See Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 (D. Wyo. 1998) (stating that
invoking primary jurisdiction would abandon statutorily-imposed duty); Trident Inv.
Management, 1995 WL 736940, at *2 (rejecting primary jurisdiction for RCRA citizen suit,
noting that statutory notice requirements provide acco=odation of agency and court
actions).
31. To the extent that courts find endangerment challenges more sympathetic candi
dates for abstention than enforcement suits, the notice provisions are more generous for the
former type of suit. See supra note 28
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The second limitation on jurisdiction prohibits a citizen suit if the
EPA or state agency is diligently prosecuting its own action under
RCRA or a specific sister statute.32 By specifying that only formal
court action bars citizen suit litigation, Congress implicitly instructed
federal courts not to treat various administrative activities, such as in
spections of a site or compliance agreements between an alleged viola
tor and the state agency, as jurisdictional hurdles.33 Courts have
unanimously understood the statutory bar to require court action, not
simply administrative inquiry.34
Together, the notice provisions and preclusion language create a
clear path guiding federal court jurisdiction over RCRA citizen suits.
Accordingly, RCRA does not leave open the kind of jurisdictional
gaps required for an application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
B.

Uniformity, Broad Enforcement, and the Federal Courts

The task of ensuring uniform application of RCRA falls upon the
federal courts rather than state agencies. Minimum national standards
are a core component of RCRA's mandate, and the broad enforce
ment mechanisms embedded in the statute charge federal courts with
guaranteeing those minimums. Without that oversight, state agencies
act in isolation and will develop disparate standards for solid and haz
ardous waste disposal.35

32. Under section 6972(b)(l){B), only diligent prosecution of "a civil or criminal action
in a court" precludes a citi2en enforcement suit. For citizen endangerment suits, an action
may be precluded by an action in a court, by EPA or state action under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C.A. §
9606 et seq., or by an EPA suit under its own endangerment authority pursuant to section
6973 of RCRA, see § 6972{b)(2){B), {C).
33. See PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 619 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. de
nied, 119 S. Ct. 871 (1999) ("Congress has specified the conditions under which the pendency
of other proceedings bars suit under RCRA, and . . . those conditions have not been satisfied
here [where agency had corresponded with the defendant]."); Proffitt v. Commissioners, 754
F.2d 504, 506 {3d Cir. 1985) (overruled on other grounds) (no preclusion where EPA had
entered a compliance order against the defendant); Morris v. Primetime Stores of Kansas,
Inc., No. 95-1328-JTM, 1996 WL 563845, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 5, 1996) (no preclusion where
a state agency and the defendant were developing a remediation plan); City of Toledo v.
Beazer Materials & Servs., Inc., 833 F. Supp. 646, 657 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding that state
agency proceedings absent action in a court are insufficient to bar a RCRA citizen suit); cf.
Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997 (D. Kan. 1997) (although
abstaining on other grounds, conceding that statutory jurisdiction exists where defendants
and state agency had entered into a consent order).
34. The statutory language in RCRA has prevented the kind of court disagreement that
has taken place in interpreting the analogous provision of the Clean Water Act. The Clean
Water Act prohibits suit where the state is prosecuting an action "comparable" to a citizen
suit action. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6){A). For a discussion of the Clean Water Act dilemma,
see Arne R. Leonard, When Should an Administrative Enforcement Action Preclude a Citi
zen Suit Under the Clean Water Act?, 35 NAT. REsOURCES J. 555, 579-617 (1995).
35. See County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1310 {2d Cir. 1990)
{"The uniformity rationale clearly does not support application of the [primary jurisdiction]
doctrine in the federal question/state agency context. Indeed, since application . . . might
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Under RCRA, Congress has determined that solid and hazardous
waste disposal is a matter of national concern.36 The statute delineates
this focus clearly, concluding that "while the collection and disposal of
solid wastes should continue to be primarily the function of State, re
gional, and local agencies, the problems of waste disposal ... have be
come a matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Fed
eral action ...."37 Moreover, Congress enacted national legislation
because piecemeal efforts by the states had proved inadequate to ad
dress U.S.waste disposal problems.38
To enforce minimum national standards, RCRA empowers the
EPA and citizens with broad enforcement authority. The EPA may
bring either a civil or criminal suit to enforce alleged RCRA viola
tions 39 and may also bring a suit if some activity creates an "imminent
hazard" justifying injunctive relief, regardless of whether the activity
involves a permit violation.40 The EPA's ongoing role demonstrates
that the statutory scheme seeks to promote federal guidelines, not to
sanction diverse regulatory policies in individual states.
Citizen suit availability acts as a crucial complement to EPA en
forcement suits in supplying uniformity. Courts have understood the
overarching purpose of citizen suits as creating private attorneys gen
eral that supplement governmental enforcement of a regulatory
scheme.41 In amending RCRA, Congress specifically recognized that
the EPA alone had been unable to enforce the statute.42 Accordingly,

well result in review by fifty different state agencies with fifty different charters, resort to
state agencies is more likely to ensure non-uniformity.").
36. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901(a)(4) (West 1997); 6902(a) (captioned "Objectives and na
tional.policy," and including objectives of "establishing a viable Federal-State partnership"
and "promoting a national research and development program").
37. § 6901(a)(4).
38. See David R. Hodas, Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Enforcement of Envi
ronmental Law in a Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforce
ment Authority ls Shared by the United States, the States and Their Citizens?, 54 Mo. L. REV.
1552, 1615-16 (1995) (discussing states reluctant to pursue penalties because it deters busi
nesses from settling there and noting that competitive issues also drive local government en
forcement).
39. See § 6928.
40. See § 6973.
41. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165 (1997). For examples of citizen suit provi
sions under other environmental statutes, see, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a) (Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7604(a) (Clean Air Act), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9659(a) (CERCLA)), and 42
U.S.C.A. § 11046(a) (Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act).
42. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 20 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576,
5579; see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Dissecting the State: The Use of Federal Law to Free
State and Local Officials from State Legislatures' Control, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1226-28
(1999) (discussing problems of federal government in monitoring and sanctioning states re
garding grant-in-aid programs); Michael J. Scicchitano & David M. Hedge, From Coercion
to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act, PUBLIUS, Fall
1993, at 107, 114 (categorizing EPA threat of revoking state's status as an approved program
as an empty one).
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in order to maximize federal court oversight, two aspects of RCRA's
citizen suit provisions are particularly broad.
First, RCRA's double grant of federal court jurisdiction for citizen
suits features an imminent endangerment provision that is unique to
RCRA among federal environmental statutes,43 allows suit against
both past and present contributors,44 and assesses liability without
fault.45 The jurisdictional grant both for enforcement and imminent
endangerment allows a wide variety of environmental harms to be ac
tionable under RCRA's statutory mandate.
Second, the statute provides generous standing for potential citizen
plaintiffs. Unlike some federal environmental statutes, which impose
a zone-of-interests requirement for the establishment of statutory
standing,46 RCRA's standing provision allows "any person" to bring
suit.47 In choosing this language, Congress conferred standing to the
fullest extent permitted by Article III.48 Congress created the broadest
possible class of potential plaintiffs in order to maximize the number
of private "enforcers" and to avoid dismissals in federal court based
on lack of standing.49
Through its extensive jurisdictional grants for citizen- and EPA
initiated suits, RCRA charges federal courts, not state agencies, with
enforcing the statute and overseeing its uniform application. Applica
tions of primary jurisdiction frustrate the realization of federal court
oversight.50

43. See Ashley C. Schannauer, RCRA Endangerment Actions: ls a Permit a Defense?, 21
COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 287, 303 (1996) (endangerment authority under other statutes limited
to the government).
44.

See 42 U.S.C.A.§ 6972(a)(l)(B) (West 1997).

45. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 98-1133, at 119 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5649, 5690 (endangerment provision in§ 7003 applies "regardless of fault or negligence").
46. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 164-65. The Bennett Court reasoned that its broad construc
tion of statutory standing for "any person" under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") was
supported by the fact that the statute was environmental, and that Congress was obviously
attempting to create "private attorneys general." 520 U.S. at 165. The Court also noted that
the "any person" language was much broader than in some other environmental statutes,
which create a zone-of-interests requirement. 520 U.S. at 164-65.
47. § 6972(a) ("any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf').
48. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165.
49. See Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165.
50. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D.
1995) (stating that primary jurisdiction stay would defeat congressional intent in cre
ating citizen suits under RCRA); United States EPA v. Waste Control, Inc., 710 F. Supp.
1172, 1184 (N.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 327 (7th Cir. 1990); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that primary jurisdiction could "frus
trate the congressional intent to broaden enforcement authority"); see also Proffitt v. Rohm
& Haas, 850 F.2d 1007 (3d Cir. 1988) (overruled on other grounds) (stating that application
of primary jurisdiction would frustrate purposes of the Oean Water Act).

Minn .
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Technical Expertise

The third justification for primary jurisdiction, that the court
should defer to an administrative body with specialized competence in
a particular area,51 is a tempting rationale in favor of applying the doc
trine to RCRA citizen suits. There is no dispute that RCRA is a com
plicated statute52 and that environmental regulations involve complex
technical matters that federal courts may not commonly encounter.53
It is understandable that a judge might prefer to transfer jurisdiction
to a state agency whose sole function is to interpret and apply envi
ronmental regulations.
What such deferrals depend on, however, is not the claim that a
federal court cannot properly adjudicate the issues before it, but that it
would be time-consuming for the court to acquire an understanding of
the complicated factual and legal issues.54 Because Congress has al
ready chosen to allocate federal court resources to this problem by en
acting RCRA's citizen suit provisions,55 a federal court judge may not
reallocate resources away from federal court jurisdiction. The statu
tory jurisdictional grant indicates that Congress expects federal courts
to devote the time necessary to acquire competence in the issues pre
sented by a RCRA suit.56

51. See Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285, 291 {1922)
{finding that determination of issue requires evaluation of facts known only to "body of ex
perts," members of ICC).
52 See 4 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 7.13, at 113 {1992)
{"The EPA's graphic on the RCRA permitting process looks something like the organiza
tional chart of the Prussian army . . . ."); Randolph L. Hill, An Overview of RCRA: The
"Mind-Numbing" Provisions of the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL. L.
REP., May 1991, at 10254.
53. See Davies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 997 {D. Kan. 1997)
(court adjudication would involve determining the threat posed by particular levels of
hazardous waste and choice of remedial measures); Friends of Santa Fe County v. LAC
Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1349-1350 (D.N.M. 1995) (court less institutionally suited
for developing remedial plan).
54. See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 997 {adjudication would duplicate extensive agency fact
finding); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1349-50 (reasoning that court could ac
quire knowledge through expert testimony or appointment of a special master, but these
methods would be a waste of judicial resources).
55. See Hodas, supra note 38, at 1576 ( '[c]ongress has leveraged the scarce federal en
forcement resources' " by creating citizen suits) (citation omitted).
"

56. See Wilson v. Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1170 {D. Wyo. 1998) (issues under
RCRA not too "esoteric" for judicial evaluation); Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F.
Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1989). The Merry court, enforcing the CWA, whose requirements
are similarly technical to those of RCRA, cited the CWA legislative history asserting that "
'enforcement of pollution regulations is not a technical matter beyond the competence of the
courts.' " Merry, 697 F. Supp. at 183 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 92-414 {1972), reprinted in 1972
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747).
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Concurrent Proceedings

The final consideration under the primary jurisdiction doctrine re
lates to the problems raised by concurrent agency and court actions.
Concurrent jurisdiction may require the court to make several inquir
ies: whether continuing parallel proceedings might impose conflicting
orders on the defendant;57 whether the administrative body will dili
gently pursue the issue if the court stays or dismisses the judicial ac
tion;58 and whether the federal court plaintiff will be able to obtain re
lief from the administrative agency if the federal court stays the
action.59 In the context of RCRA citizen suits, these issues do not jus
tify application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
The first concern, that agency and federal court involvement might
result in conflicting obligations for the defendant, is simply not viable
where the state and federal bodies operate as part of a single regula
tory scheme. In order to receive authorization from the EPA, the
state's program must be equivalent to the federal program: the state
may not impose requirements less stringent than those in force under
the federal regulations.60 Thus, a federal court's imposition of more
stringent obligations on the defendant simply brings the state adminis
trative rule back into compliance with the federal statute. Under the
terms of RCRA's federal-state structure, relief granted by the federal
court thus cannot create a "conflicting" order on the defendant be
cause federal authority ultimately defines the defendant's statutory
obligations.
Second, rejecting primary jurisdiction keeps the meaning of "dili
gence" consistent with RCRA's statutory standard as to what level of
administrative diligence bars a citizen suit.61 RCRA specifies that only

57.

See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998; Friends ofSanta Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350.

58.

See Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998; Friends ofSanta Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350.

59. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 406 (1970) (primary jurisdiction inappropriate
where agency had no procedure through which petitioners could seek review of adverse ad
ministrative ruling).
60. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1997) (regarding hazardous waste plans); § 6947(a)
(regarding state plans generally). As articulated in section 6929, nothing prohibits a state
from developing more stringent guidelines than those required by RCRA. In a case where a
citizen plaintiff claimed a violation under such a state law, however, there would not be a
RCRA cause of action and abstention would not be an issue.
61. See Trident Inv. Management, Inc. v. Bhambra, No. 95 C 4260, 1995 WL 736940, at
*2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 1995) (holding that judicial restraint is defined not by common law
primary jurisdiction doctrine, but by statutory mandate); Sierra Club v. United States DOE,
734 F. Supp. 946, 951-52 (D. Colo. 1990) (holding that citizen suit goes forward unless agency
is "diligently prosecuting" an action in a court pursuant to§ 6972(b)(l)(B)). But see Davies,
963 F. Supp. at 998 (applying primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suit where agency had
ongoing oversight over defendant); Friends of Santa Fe County, 892 F. Supp. at 1350
(applying primary jurisdiction to RCRA citizen suit where agency proceedings preceded
suit).
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"diligent prosecut[ion]"62 by the EPA or state agency in a court bars a
RCRA citizen suit. Given that statutory command, a federal court
may not create a separate standard as to what level of administrative
investigation is sufficient to dismiss a citizen suit. When federal courts
have ignored the statutory definition of "diligence" in favor of defer
ence to local agencies, communities have waited years for genuine en
forcement of the statute.63 Such a result allows the old problems of
purely local enforcement to resurface and thus defeats the purpose of
enacting national legislation.
The final policy concern, fairness to plaintiffs, particularly supports
a rejection of primary jurisdiction in the citizen suit context. Because
RCRA establishes exclusive federal causes of action for citizen suits,64
citizen plaintiffs cannot take their cases to other tribunals.65 Federal
court jurisdiction is thus necessary to allow plaintiffs access to the
remedies provided by the statute.66
Until recently, the federal courts were in accord that the RCRA
provision stating that citizen suits "shall be brought in the district
court"6 7 confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts.68 The
Sixth Circuit recently defected from that view in Davis v. Sun Oil
Co. ,69 however, concluding that RCRA's jurisdictional language is in
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption in favor of concurrent
See § 6972{ b){l){B), {6){2){B), { b){2)(C){i), {b){2){C)(iii).
63. See Merry v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 697 F. Supp. 180, 183 (M.D. Pa. 1988) (stat

62

ing that primary jurisdiction could allow state or federal government to frustrate congres
sional intent "by delay in action or applications"). In one case where the court applied pri
mary jurisdiction, it admitted that the administrative agency, which had failed to take action
for fourteen years, did not appear to fare particularly well under primary jurisdiction's "dili
gence" factor. The court concluded, however, that a stay of federal court jurisdiction was
warranted because the agency was "on the verge of addressing remediation" of a contami
nated site. Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 998.
64.

See § 6972{a).

65. See Craig Lyle Ltd. Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 483 (D.
Minn. 1995) (primary jurisdiction would greatly reduce cases where plaintiffs could bring
citizen suits). But see Friends of Santa Fe County, 972 F. Supp. at 1350 (applying primary ju
risdiction, reasoning that plaintiffs could have pursued remedies through state court review
of administrative determinations).
66. The Supreme Court has not always considered comparable relief for plaintiffs in the
administrative forum to be a necessary prerequisite for the application of primary jurisdic
tion. See Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). Ricci applied the primary
jurisdiction doctrine even though plaintiff had no right to initiate or intervene in a proceed
ing before the administrative body. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 311-12 {Marshall, J., dissenting).
The majority, however, noted that if the agency refused to act, the federal court could again
assume jurisdiction. See Ricci, 409 U.S. at 304 n.14.
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972{a) (West 1997) (emphasis added).
68. See Fletcher v. United States, 116 F.3d 1315, 1327 {10th Cir. 1997); Reservation Tel.
Coop. v. Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation, 76 F.3d 181, 185-86 (8th Cir.
1996).
69. Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d 606 (6th Cir. 1998) (state courts may also hear RCRA
citizen suits).
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jurisdiction. 70 That decision was misguided for two reasons.
First, the court improperly relied on the Supreme Court's decision
in Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly.71 That case held that Title
VII's jurisdictional language, providing that federal courts "shall have
jurisdiction of actions," 72 did not confer exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal courts. Yet Title VII's jurisdictional provision is easily distin
guishable from RCRA's. The mandatory language of Title VII dis
cusses only whether federal courts shall have jurisdiction in general,
i.e., the power to· hear a case. 73 The language of RCRA, on the other
hand, discusses where citizen plaintiffs must bring their suits. The Sun
Oil court reached a contrary view only by narrowly focusing on the
word "shall" without attention to the surrounding language.
Second, the Supreme Court has elsewhere suggested that manda
tory statutory language regarding where plaintiffs should bring suits
would confer exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts. In Taf!Un v.
Levitt,74 the Court held that language in RICO, which reads that "[a]ny
person injured . . may sue therfor [sic] in any appropriate United
States district court," 75 did not establish exclusive jurisdiction.76 The
Court noted that RICO "provides that suits of the kind described
'may' be brought in the federal district courts, not that they must be."17
This statement suggests that mandatory language such as "shall" in the
place of "may" would have established exclusive jurisdiction.78
.

***

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction allows courts to further the
purposes of a statutory scheme by allocating jurisdiction already

70. 148 F.3d at 611-612.
71. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820, 825 (1990).
72. Yellow Freight, 494 U.S. at 823 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1982)).
73. See BL ACK S LAW DICTIONARY 584(6th ed. 1991) (defining "Li]urisdiction of the
subject matter" as "(p]ower of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before
it").
'

74. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
75. 493 U.S. at 460 (emphasis added by Court) (quoting 18 U.S.C.§ 1964(c)).
76. 493 U.S. at 460.
77. 493 U.S. at 460-61 (emphasis added) (quoting Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,
368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962)).
78. The legislative history also supports the exclusive jurisdiction rule. The House Re·
port addressed the concern that the cause of action would allow plaintiffs to bring many
state law claims with their RCRA cause of action under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine.
See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 118 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5634
(stating minority views on the amendment, which complain that new burden on federal
courts is "potentially crushing" and that federal court judges will have to tum to state courts
for guidance during the course of the suit). No House member suggested the obvious solu·
tion: that such mixed claims of federal and state law could be brought in state court.
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shared by courts and agencies. Where, as in RCRA, the statute has
explicitly delineated the jurisdictional relationship, a court cannot
transfer its duties to an administrative body, particularly when those
duties achieve the very goals that the primary jurisdiction doctrine
seeks to protect. B eyond seeking an agency's opinion on a limited fac
tual matter,79 a court should not decline jurisdiction of a RCRA citizen
suit based on primary jurisdiction.
II.

B URF ORD .ABSTENTION

The Burford abstention doctrine seeks to protect "complex state
administrative processes" from undue interference by the federal
courts.80 Three core components are necessary for the application of
the Burford doctrine: the presence in a case of "distinctively local
regulatory facts or policies";81 a danger that federal court adjudication
will disrupt a state's policy or regulatory framework on a broad basis;82
and an assurance that the federal court plaintiffs will be able to pursue
their claim in state courts if the federal court dismisses the matter.83
The doctrine should be applied only in rare and compelling circum
stances.84 The Supreme Court has described the federal courts' obliga
tion to hear suits within their jurisdiction as "virtually unflagging."85
This Part argues that application of the Burford doctrine is never
appropriate for a federal statute like RCRA, which operates under a
theory of cooperative federalism. Section II.A demonstrates that the
federal focus of RCRA makes Burford abstention incompatible with
RCRA citizen suits. Section II.B addresses the special problem of
citizen suits brought as siting or permitting challenges and concludes

79. This Note does not challenge more limited uses of primary jurisdiction, in which a
court stays an action pending an agency's factual determination regarding a discrete issue.
80. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 362 (1989).
81. 491 U.S. at 364.
82. The Burford doctrine describes two types of such disruption: "(l) when there are
'difficult questions of state [or local] law bearing on policy problems of substantial public
import whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar'; or (2) where the 'ex
ercise of federal review of the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public con
cern.' " New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361 (quoting Colorado River Water Conserva
tion Dist v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976)).
83. See 491 U.S. at 361. This requirement seeks to assure a federal court considering ab
stention that dismissing or staying the federal suit will not work an injustice on the individual
litigants. See Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 319 (1943). Such a system of state court review is
simply a prerequisite for performing a Burford analysis, not a satisfaction of the test itself.
See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 361; Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 814.
84.

See New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 358.

85. New
203 (1988)).

Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S.

at 359 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193,
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that statutory bars, rather than Burford abstention, justify dismissal of
such suits.
A.

RCRA's Federal Mandate

RCRA citizen suits are singularly poor candidates for Burford ab
stention. This section demonstrates that the cluster of issues necessary
for an application of Burford abstention is not present in a RCRA
citizen suit, which provides a federal cause of action and requires the
application of federal law. Section II.A.1 addresses the "local law"
requirement of Burford and argues that in passing RCRA, Congress
explicitly defined waste disposal as a matter of national concern and
developed a comprehensive federal statutory scheme. Section II.A.2
illustrates that the concern that federal courts might interfere with a
state's efforts to establish a coherent waste disposal policy is not rele
vant in the RCRA context. Section II.A.3 demonstrates that federal
courts that have applied Burford in situations where states have de
veloped a specialized state court review system have mistaken a pre
requisite for applying the doctrine for a satisfaction of its criteria. This
error has allowed a circumvention of the federal focus of the statute.
1.

The Statutory Framework

RCRA's comprehensive mandate deprives a federal court of the
authority to define waste disposal as a local problem. As discussed in
Part I, RCRA establishes waste disposal as a matter of national con
cern.86 Unlike the particularly local issues held applicable for Burford
abstention, a RCRA citizen suit presents a statutory federal cause of
action to enforce national minimum standards and thus does not pro
vide the types of state-based legal issues that would implicate Burford.
Despite the statute's emphasis on the importance of national goals
and federal enforcement, courts have varied in their assessments of
whether a RCRA suit involves only "local" law.87 Courts that have
dismissed RCRA citizen suits as local matters under Burford have
done so under two theories. First, some courts have argued that an
underlying issue in a RCRA case, land use generally, has traditionally

86.

See supra section J.B.

87. See White & Brewer Trucking, Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1314 ( C.D. Ill.
1997) (finding open dumping to be a national rather than local problem); Craig Lyle Ltd.
Partnership v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 476, 484 (D. Minn. 1995) (ruling that under
R CRA, " Congress has found the problems of solid and hazardous waste to be national as
opposed to an "essentially local problem"). But see Coalition for Health Concern v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir. 1995) ("Kentucky has an over
riding interest in the protection of its environment . . . exercise of federal review would be
disruptive of Kentucky's efforts to establish a coherent policy with respect to the licensing of
hazardous waste facilities.").
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been treated as a local problem.88 Second, others have claimed that
once the EPA has authorized a state program to operate "in lieu"89 of
RCRA's federal regulations, the issues at stake in a RCRA citizen suit
become local matters suitable for abstention.90 Neither of these char
acterizations is persuasive.
The first rationale, based on the characterization of land use law as
a local matter, ignores the fact that the specifically national attention
given by Congress to solid and hazardous waste disposal overrides the
traditional treatment of a general area of law.91 RCRA's clear na
tional mandate does not allow retreat to the traditional view of waste
disposal as a local land use issue.
The applicability of the second theory, that an authorized state
program transforms RCRA issues into local ones, ignores the relation
ship between the approved program and the federal statute.92 In
drafting and amending RCRA, Congress envisioned a cooperative re
lationship between the federal government and the states.93 The leg
islative history of the 1984 amendments to RCRA emphasizes the cen
trality of a federal-state partnership to the statutory goals:
The successful implementation of the 1984 amendments will require an
improved working relationship between the Environmental Protection
Agency and the states. The development of a viable federal-state part
nership is one of the highest priorities of this legislation, and the agency
should devote greater effort to assisting states in achieving authorization
of their RCRA programs.94

88. See Sugarloaf Citizens Ass'n v. Montgomery County, No. 9 3-2475, 1994 WL 4 47442,
at * 3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 1994).
89. See, e.g., 42 U.S. C. A. § 6926 (West 1997) (regarding approval of state programs per
taining to hazardous waste disposal).
90. See Coalition for Health Concern, 60 F. 3d at 1194. The court abstained because
plaintiff's R CR A clainls did not "arise in isolation from state law issues." 60 F. 3d at 1194.
This formulation deviates from established confines of the Burford test and would bring a
wide array of cases with mixed issues of federal and state law into the realm of the Burford
doctrine.
91. See White & Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1 314; Craig Lyle Ltd., 877 F. Supp. at
484; Sierra Club v. United States D OE, 7 34 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D. Colo. 1990) (noting that
state regulations essentially mirror those of the EP A and concluding that "analysis of the
federal scheme [R CR A] overlays and defines that of Colorado"); see also supra section J.B.
92. This Note does not address the issue of whether state law operating "in lieu" of the
federal regulations with EP A approval preempts a R CR A citizen suit, even though the EP A
may still bring an enforcement or endangerment action. Most courts have rejected this view.
See Acme Printing Ink Co. v. Menard, Inc., 881 F. Supp. 12 37, 1244 (E.D. Wis. 1995) (re
jecting preemption theory and collecting cases with both views). The position of the EP A is
that citizen suit availability is not preempted by state authorization. See 49 Fed. Reg. 48, 300,
48, 304 (1984); see also Adam Babich, Is RCRA Enforceable by Citizen Suit in States with
Authorized Hazardous Waste Programs?, 23 ENVfL. L. REP. 10, 56 (Sept 199 3) (arguing no
preemption).
9 3.

See supra notes

37, 87.

94. H.R. CONF. REP. 98-11 3 3, at 81 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. C. C.AN. 5649, 5651.
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While the statute promotes state implementation of solid and haz
ardous waste disposal programs, such plans are approved and con
stantly overseen at the federal level to maintain their conformance
with the RCRA guidelines.95 Because the federal guidelines control
and shape state programs operating pursuant to them, there is no am
biguity about the dominance of the federal statutory goals in enforcing
the state regulations.
This interdependent relationship is distinct from the two fact set
tings in which the Supreme Court has utilized the Burford doctrine.
The core issues of those cases were state or local rules given substan
tial deference by federal courts and operating independently from any
federal legislation.96 No federal statutory scheme was at issue.97
In the context of intertwined federal and state regulatory schemes,
the Court has specifically rejected the applicability of the Burford doc
trine. In New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of New Orleans
("NOPSI''),98 the plaintiff nuclear power company challenged a local
rate-making body's allocation among energy producers of Federal En
ergy Regulatory Commission rate increases.99 Although the actions of
a local regulator were at issue,100 the Court held that the suit's nucleus
of federal issues precluded an application of Burford.101 Because
RCRA similarly involves federal law operating through a state appa
ratus, Burford abstention is inappropriate in the context of a citizen
suit brought under the statute.

2.

State Regulatory Schemes

RCRA's federal emphasis also disallows

Burford abstention under

95. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6947(a) (West 1997). The EPA has continuing oversight over the
state program and may modify or revoke the state's authority to operate under RCRA. See
text accompanying notes 40-41 regarding the EPA's enforcement power.
96. See Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341, 347 (1951)
(raising issues about local need for intrastate rail service); Burford v. Sun Oil, 319 U.S. 315,
331 (1943) (involving the state regulation of oil drilling).
97. See Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. at 349 (involving legality of state commission's order
for railroad to continue intrastate rail service); Burford, 319 U.S. at 327, 331 (case centered
on state commission's application of Texas oil and gas regulations). Even commentators
favoring abstention agree that abstention must conform to statutory intent, not overrule it.
See, e.g., Michael Wells, Why Professor Redish is Wrong About Abstention, 19 GA. L. REV.
1097, 1103-1108 (1985) (abstention appropriate where a cause of action is judge-made rather
than statutory).
98. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358-64 (1989).
NOPSI, along with Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996), are the Court's
most recent discussions of Burford abstention.
99. New Orleans Pub. Serv., 491 U.S. at 352-57 (suit raised preemption, due process, and
takings issues).
100. Indeed, the plaintiff also filed a suit in Louisiana state court. See 491 U.S. at 357-58
& n3.
101. See 491 U.S. at 361.
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the theory that federal adj udication might disrupt the development of
a state's whole policy or regulatory framework in some area.102 In the
RCRA context, judicial determinations in favor of dismissal have
failed to provide any reason why federal court review of a particular
state administrative action would be disruptive to the state's policy as
a whole.103 It is doubtful that a determination as to one defendant's
compliance with federal and state law would disrupt the entire waste
disposal policy of a state.104
More importantly, such deference to a state's hazardous waste
policy assumes that under RCRA, federal j udges should give defer
ence to the integrity of a state's individual program rather than to that
of the federal program. The explicit goals and structure of RCRA run
counter to a conclusion that the best interests of a state's program are
at odds with federal oversight. The only situation where a state's pol
icy might be affected by adj udication would be one in which a state
had exercised its right to enact stricter standards than the federal stat
ute required.105 In this case, however, violations of the state's unique
rule would not be actionable under the federal RCRA cause of ac
tion.106 Abstaining from hearing a RCRA suit on Burford grounds is
inappropriate because it requires the federal court to ignore the fed
eral-state structure of the statute.

102 See 491 U.S. at 363 ( '[T]here is . . . no doctrine requiring abstention merely be
cause resolution of a federal question may result in the overturning of a state policy.' ")
(citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 380 n.5 (1978)).
"

103. See Coalition for Health Concern v. LWD, Inc., 60 F.3d 1188, 1195 (6th Cir. 1995)
(concluding, without explanation, that adjudication would interfere with state's policy); Da
vies v. National Coop. Refinery Ass'n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997) (abstaining be
cause interference with state agency's activities could undercut efforts by Kansas to develop
a coherent hazardous waste policy).
104. See Morton College Bd. of Trustees v. Town of Cicero, 18 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927
(N.D. Ill. 1998) (rejecting defendant's claim that federal court adjudication would disrupt
Illinois's environmental policy). One court has abstained partly on the basis that the policy
impact of the case would transcend the results of the litigation itself. See Sugarloaf Citizens
Ass'n v. Montgomery County, No. 93-2475, 1194 WL 447442, at *3 (4th Cir. Aug. 17, 1994).
This reasoning appears to reflect a concern that the court's adjudication would amount to
legislative, rather than judicial, action. If a court finds the task before it to be truly legisla
tive in character, it should dismiss the action on ripeness grounds, not under Burford. See
NOPSI, 491 U.S. 350, 372 (1989); see also Young, supra note 2, at 886-900 (discussing
blurred distinctions over time between "legislative," "executive," and "judicial" legal forms,
and the mystification of the administrative law process at the time Burford doctrine devel
oped).
105. States are free to enact stricter standards than the federal statute requires. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 6929 (West 1997).
106. Where state standards are identical to RCRA regulations, violations of a state
permit in a state approved to regulate in lieu of RCRA continue to be actionable under fed
eral law. See, e.g., § 6928(a)(2) (authorizing suit by EPA regarding violation of a state's haz
ardous waste program).
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Specialized State Court Review

The final rationale for Burford abstention of RCRA citizen suits,
that the state has developed a specialized court process for review of
state administrative decisions, is unpersuasive for three reasons: the
purpose underlying the state court review requirement, which seeks to
protect plaintiffs' interests if their federal case is dismissed; the failure
of a state court procedural rule to supply a substantive state interest;
and the opportunity such a rule would provide to circumvent the fed
eral statute.
First, the rationale behind Burford's state court review rule,
providing fairness to litigants, weighs heavily against abstention.
Under RCRA, Congress has conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the
federal courts for the vindication of a statutory right.107 Citizen
plaintiffs cannot pursue their RCRA claims if a federal court abstains
under Burford.
The second reason weighing against using state court review as a
ground for abstention is that a state's establishment of a specialized
state court review process does not provide a state interest that over
rides RCRA's statutory jurisdictional grants.108 The federal or state
nature of a statutory scheme stems from its substantive subject matter,
not from the procedural trappings of one system or another.109 In
passing RCRA, Congress clearly delineated the substantive federal is
sues at stake.
Third, federal court abstention based on state court reviewability
creates an opportunity for recalcitrant states to avoid federal judicial
review under RCRA by developing "specialized" state court proce
dures that the state claims are central to the development of a state
waste disposal policy. Such procedures, which could be as simple as
assigning challenges to state administrative procedures to a court in a
particular county,110 would allow a state to become the final judge of

107. See supra notes 64-78 and accompanying text; see also White & Brewer Trucking,
Inc. v. Donley, 952 F. Supp. 1306, 1311 (C.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that exclusive federal cause
of action for RCRA citizen suits prevents application of Burford). The White & Brewer
Trucking court applied the Seventh Circuit's standard for Burford abstention under General
Ry. Signal Co. v. Corcoran, 921 F.2d 700, 708-09 (7th Cir. 1991), which explicitly considers
whether the cause of action is exclusively federal as part of its Burford analysis. See White &
Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1311.
108. See White & Brewer Trucking, 952 F. Supp. at 1313 {allowing RCRA claim despite
fact that plaintiffs could have participated in state administrative review process, partially
because plaintiffs can only raise section 6972 claims before federal court). But see Coalition
for Health Concern, 60 F.3d at 1194 (process of review for permit issuance is evidence of
Kentucky's interest in developing a coherent state policy); Ada-Cascade Watch Co. v. Cas
cade Resource Recovery, Inc., 720 F.2d 897, 905 (6th Cir. 1983) (finding that centralized re
view in a single state court is evidence of Michigan's interest); Friends of Santa Fe County v.
LAC Minerals, Inc., 892 F. Supp. 1333, 1348 (D.N.M. 1995).
109. See supra note 83.
110. See Ada-Cascade Watch Co., 720 F2d at 905 (holding that Michigan had manifested
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its solid and hazardous waste decisions, and thus would defeat the
statutory mandate in favor of ongoing federal oversight.
B. Permitting and Siting Challenges
RCRA's expansive jurisdictional grants leave a federal court with
little discretion as to whether to decline jurisdiction of a citizen suit.
Some citizen suits, however, amount solely to challenges of permitting
or siting determinations. These suits make no claim that the defen
dant company has violated a permit or that the disposal plan will be
endangering for reasons not considered by the permitting agency;
rather, they question the validity of the agency's permitting or siting
determination. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits have abstained from
hearing such citizen suits by invoking the Burford doctrine.111 In turn,
these decisions have paved the way for courts to use the doctrine to
decline jurisdiction in other types of RCRA citizen suits.112
This section argues that Congress did not intend for citizen suits to
provide a federal forum for the review of solid or hazardous waste
disposal permits or siting determinations, but instead, designed the
statute so that the permitting and siting decisions of the EPA and state
agencies would have res judicata effect on this type of citizen suit
challenge. Section II.B.1 illustrates that RCRA's broad jurisdictional
grant does not extend to suits that simply challenge an agency's per
mitting or siting decision. Section II.B.2 maintains that the statutorily
provided review process regarding permitting and siting determina
tions should be plaintiffs' exclusive forum as long as they were granted
a full hearing of the issues subsequently raised in the RCRA citizen
suit. This statutory exclusion obviates the necessity for courts to em
ploy the Burford abstention doctrine to dismiss RCRA citizen suits
that challenge permits and siting.
1.

Statutory Bars

The broad statutory authority for RCRA citizen suits does not ex
tend to actions that are simply appeals of state or EPA permitting or
siting decisions. Two specific jurisdictional limits illustrate that Con
gress did not intend citizen suits to provide an avenue for permitting
or siting appeals.113

desire for coherent policy by centralizing review of hazardous waste management in one
county's circuit court; centralization allowed that court to gain expertise in the field).
111. See supra note 9
112 See supra note 10.
113. A citizen suit plaintiff could sue the governmental agency directly regarding an im
properly issued permit, subject to Eleventh Amendment limitations. See 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 6972(a)(l)(A) (West 1997).
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The first jurisdictional limit, section 6976(b) , constrains the forum
for all EPA-issued permit challenges to circuit court review within
ninety days of the permitting decision.114 Section 6976(b) further
states that after the 90 days have passed, the terms of permits may not
be challenged in any suit for enforcement.115 Because the provision
describes the barred claims as "enforcement suits," some commenta
tors116 and plaintiffs have claimed that the jurisdictional bar applies
only to "enforcement" suits, which challenge violations of the statute
or a permit,117 and not to "imminent endangerment" suits, which chal
lenge conditions that pose an immediate danger to the environment.118
This "plain meaning" reading accomplishes a result contrary to the
structure of the statute as a whole.
The jurisdictional bar applies to both types of RCRA citizen suits
for two reasons.119 First, including endangerment suits in the sec
tion 6976(b) provision would have appeared unnecessary at the time
Congress passed the provision.
The original purpose of section
6976(b) was to preclude defendants from challenging the terms of
their RCRA permits as a defense to EPA, state, or citizen enforce-

114. See § 6976(b) ("Review of the Administrator's action . . . may be had by any inter
ested person in the Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States . . . . Action of the Ad
ministrator with respect to which review could have been obtained under this subsection shall
not be subject to judicial review in civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement. Such review
shall be in accordance with sections 701 through 706 of [The Administrative Procedure
Act]." (emphasis added)).
115. See § 6976(b). This bar applies to state-issued permits, as well. See 40 C.F.R. §
271.14(b)(1998). That provision makes 40 C.F.R. § 270.4(a) applicable to state programs.
Section 270.4(a) reads, "compliance with a RCRA permit during its term constitutes compli
ance, for purposes of enforcement, with subtitle C of RCRA . . . ." § 270.4(a).
116. See Schannauer, supra note 43, at 287-92, 317.
117. See § 6972(a)(l) (A).
118. See § 6972(a){l)(B). One commentator has defined the "inuninent and substantial
endangerment" cause of action as one alleging a "significant potential risk of eventual envi
ronmental harm." See Adam Babich, RCRA Imminent Hazard Authority: A Powerful Tool
for Businesses, Governments, and Citizen Enforcers, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Environ
mental Law (C883 ALI-ABA 81), Feb. 17-19, 1994, at 97. Courts have described the provi
sion as a federalization of the common law nuisance claim. See Middlesex City Bd. of Cho
sen Freeholders v. New Jersey, 645 F. Supp. 715, 721-22 (D.N.J. 1986).
119. The judicial review provision was copied from identical language in the Clean
Water Act and Clean Air Act, neither of which have imminent endangerment causes of
action. See S. REP. No. 96-172, at 5 {1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5024.
Congress added the estoppel language to RCRA, however, as part of the same amendment
in which RCRA's imminent endangerment provisions were added. See H.R. REP. No. 98198, pt. 1, at 47-49 {1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606-08. The chronology of
the amendments is thus ambiguous: on one hand, Congress may have used generic statutory
language for environmental legislation and failed to consider the necessity of broader
language for RCRA's judicial review provision; on the other hand, Congress must have
considered that necessity because the endangerment provisions were specifically on the table
at the time, and rejected estoppel that would preclude permit or siting challenges as part of
an endangerment citizen suit.
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ment of the statute.120 While endangerment suits have now been
brought against permitted facilities, the jurisdictional provision had in
the past only been used to address abandoned or dormant facilities
that had not undergone a permitting process.121 Thus there would
have appeared no possibility that endangerment suit defendants could
mount a permit challenge defense, making the bar of section 6976(b)
irrelevant to that type of suit.
Second, applying the permit-challenge bar only to enforcement
suits would interpret the section in a manner that conflicts with other
provisions of RCRA. In other parts of the Act, the jurisdictional grant
for enforcement suits is more generous than that for endangerment
suits. The endangerment provision requires a longer waiting period
between the time notice is given to the defendant and governmental
officials and the time suit is filed.122 In addition, the endangerment
cause of action is precluded by a wider variety of governmental reme
dial steps.123 It would be illogical to grant a stricter jurisdictional bar
on enforcement suits, the more encouraged provision in the statutory
scheme, than on endangerment suits.
Allowing citizen suits as an alternative route for permitting and
siting challenges would create one further, serious statutory inconsis
tency: the scope of judicial review of the agency's decision would be
different under the permit-review provision than under the permit
challenge citizen suit. The scope of judicial review under section
6976(b) of RCRA occurs pursuant to the standards of the Administra
tive Procedure Act ("APA").124 For purposes of reviewing RCRA de
cisions, the APA allows judicial reversal only where the agency's deci
sion is arbitrary and capricious, without ob�ervance of required
procedures or unsupported by substantial evidence.125 This standard is
deferential to the agency.126

120. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1 at 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576,
5614 ("Addition of this language . . . would clarify that defendants in Federal enforcement
proceedings cannot challenge permit terms and conditions or State program provisions if
such provisions could have been challenged in the courts of appeals at the time the permit
was issued.").
121. See Schannauer, supra note 43 at 291. Under the EPA's parallel authority to bring
analogous inlminent endangerment suits under section 6973, all actions to date have in
volved non-permitted facilities. See id. at 319-320.
122. See supra note 28.
123. See supra note 32.
124. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6976(b) (West 1997) ("Such review shall be in accordance with
sections 701 through 706 of Title 5 [the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Pro
cedure Act].").
125. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D), (E) (1994).
126. See Motor Vehicle Manufacturers' Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("The scope of review under the 'arbitrary and capricious' standard is nar
row and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.").
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In hearing a citizen suit, on the other hand, a district court looks at
all issues of endangerment on a blank slate and would labor under no
such statutory restraints.127 The statute cannot plausibly contain such
disparate review standards based merely on the plaintiff's choice of
statutory provision.
In summary, the history of section 6976(b), the jurisdictional
treatment of endangerment suits compared to enforcement suits, and
the inconsistent scopes of review between the permit-review and citi
zen suit provisions all demonstrate that section 6976(b) should apply
with equal force whether a plaintiff brings an endangerment or en
forcement suit regarding a permitted facility. A citizen suit may not
function as an alternate route to the circuit court for appeal of a per
mitting decision of the EPA.128
The second jurisdictional bar, section 6972(b)(2)(D), prohibits
imminent endangerment suits as a challenge to either EPA or state
siting or permitting of a "hazardous waste treatment, storage, or a dis
posal facility."129 The fact that the provision mentions hazardous
waste and not solid waste again reflects a failure to anticipate the
breadth of purposes for which imminent endangerment suits have
come to be used.
The inclusion of section 6972(b) (2) (D) reflected a realization that
citizen plaintiffs might otherwise use their imminent endangerment
authority, an "emergency" provision, to challenge the siting of haz
ardous waste facilities.130 Including solid waste siting and permitting in
the bar would have appeared unnecessary. RCRA defines "hazardous
waste" as solid waste that could be endangering to human health or
the environment.131 Only hazardous waste, therefore, would seem to
present conditions giving rise to an imminent endangerment cause of

127. No citizen suit provision mentions any deference to any permitting terms. This si
lence is consistent with the thesis of this Note that citizen suits are not meant as permit
challenge mechanisms.
128. See Greenpeace, Inc. v. Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir. 1993) {de
scribing citizen suit as "improper collateral attack on the prior permitting decisions of the
U.S. EPA"); Palumbo v. Waste Techs. Indus., 989 F.2d 156, 159 (4th Cir. 1993) (overruled
on other grounds) (citizen suit may not replace direct appeal procedure under § 6976(b)).
129. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6972(b)(2)(D) (West 1997) ("No action may be commenced un
der subsection (a)(l)(B) of this section by any person (other than a State or local govern
ment) with respect to the siting of a hazardous waste treatment, storage or a disposal facility,
nor to restrain or enjoin the issuance of a permit for such facility.").
130. The legislative history indicates that the imminent endangerment provision was de
signed to respond to hazardous waste emergencies. See H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt. 1, at 11819 {1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5634-35.
131. See § 6903(5) (" 'hazardous waste' means a solid waste, . . . [which may] (A) cause,
or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or
incapacitating reversible, illness; or (B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to hu
man health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed").
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action.132 Permitting and siting decisions regarding non-hazardous
solid waste disposal are inherently outside the scope of RCRA's grant
of jurisdiction under the imminent endangerment provision.
The 1984 House Report regarding section 6972(b)(2)(D) confirms
this reading, concluding that "other legal authority [besides citizen
suits] is available to challenge deficiencies in the permitting proc
ess. "133 To read the statute as creating an exception for citizen suits
that challenge solid waste disposal permits reaches an absurd result:
citizen plaintiffs would have more authority under the endangerment
provision to challenge solid waste disposal than hazardous waste dis
posal, even though the latter category is defined by its potential for
endangerment.134
Congress intended neither the enforcement nor endangerment
RCRA citizen suit provisions to provide an alternate route for direct
permit appeal. Admittedly, no single statutory provision spells out a
blanket prohibition on citizen suits as permit challenges. Yet when
the statutory authority disallowing particular types of such actions is
taken together, as Table 1 demonstrates, it is apparent that Congress
did not consider citizens' dissatisfaction with siting or permitting deci
sions, without any other complaint, to state a cause of action under
RCRA.
Table 1. Provisions barring permitting/siting challenges
through RCRA citizen suits.
Hazardous Waste Permit

Solid Waste Permit

6972(b)(2)(D)

[Combination of both provisions suggest this quadrant is barred as well]

6976(b)

6976(b)

Endangerment
Suit
6972(a)(l)(B)
Enforcement
Suit
6972(a)(l)(A)

132. See H.R. Rep. 98-198, pt 1, at 47 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5606.
The legislative history notes that the EPA's parallel imminent endangerment authority ex
tends to "all wastes that meet the statutory definition of hazardous waste (section 1004(5))."
Id.
133. H.R. REP. No. 98-198, pt 1, at 53 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576,
5612.
134. See generally 40 C.F.R. § 270.4 (1998) ("Compliance with a RCRA permit during
its term constitutes compliance, for purposes of enforcement, with subtitle C of RCRA ex
cept for those requirements not included in the permit . . . . )
"

.
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Other Opportunities for Hearing

Although RCRA's citizen suit relief is unavailable for siting and
permit challenges, other legal procedures allow public participation
during the process of site determination and issuance or denial of
permits. RCRA protects citizens by building a number of procedural
opportunities into the requirements of the permitting and siting proc
ess. These mechanisms allow some form of citizen involvement at all
stages of the regulatory process.
Opportunities for public participation extend to siting and the is
suance of permits. Before issuing any permit, the EPA must provide
public notice of its intent and must hold hearings if it receives written
notice of opposition to the permit.135 In order for a state to be
authorized to operate in lieu of the EPA, the state must abide by
equivalent notice and hearing requirements.136 RCRA also provides
that "any person" may petition for the promulgation, amendment, or
repeal of any regulations.137
Once the EPA has reached a permitting decision, citizen plaintiffs
may appeal directly to a federal circuit court.138 While RCRA does
not specify a method of appeal for state-issued permits, the availability
of judicial review under a state's program is taken into account by the
EPA when it decides whether to approve the state's program.139 This
emphasis on congressionally required opportunities to participate in
the proceedings and to appeal supports the notion that the statute cre
ates a route for citizen input within the permitting and siting process
that citizen suits may not circumvent.
Permit challenges through citizen suits should still be available in
certain limited circumstances: where new issues arise after the issu
ance of the permit and appellate review is no longer available;140 or
where, under a state-approved program, the plaintiffs have not been
allowed to participate in the permitting process or to obtain judicial
review of the permit. Other than these situations, there is no statutory
authority under RCRA to use a citizen suit as a permit or siting ap
peal. The use of Burford dismissals rather than statutory authority to

135. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6974(b)(2) (West 1997).
136. See § 6974(b)(2) ("No State program which provides for the issuance of permits re
ferred to in this paragraph may be authorized by the Administrator under section 6926 of
this title unless such program provides for the notice and hearing required by the para
graph.").
137. See § 6974(a).
138. See § 6976(b). Review "may be had by any interested person." Id.
139. See 40 C.F.R. 271.14 (x), (y), (z), (aa). These provisions refer the reader to regula
tions applicable to approved state programs operating under the Clean Water Act. See 40
C.F.R. 124.10, 124.11, 124.12(a), 124.17.
140. See § 6976(b).
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dismiss such suits has lead to a distortion of the doctrine and to dis
missals of other types of RCRA suits that were properly before a
court.
***

Burford allows a federal court to avoid a collision with distinctively
local regulatory schemes, not to substitute its judgment for that of
Congress about what types of state court action should preclude a
RCRA citizen suit. Where, as in RCRA, Congress has created a com
prehensive, national, legislative scheme, a federal court lacks the
power to redefine the issue as "local," and to reassess when it should
assume jurisdiction. For suits which simply amount to challenges of a
permitting or siting process, federal courts need not resort to absten
tion to refuse jurisdiction because there is no statutory authority for
citizen suits in those situations. For other kinds of RCRA citizen suits,
federal courts must assume jurisdiction unless the statutorily defined
enforcement action has been undertaken.
III. .ABSTENTION AND THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
Given the specificity and breadth of RCRA's statutory scheme, ab
staining from hearing a RCRA citizen suit is outside the established
boundaries of the Burford and primary jurisdiction doctrines. Even
beyond the statutory mandate, abstention fails to serve the values of
federalism claimed by pro-abstention advocates. Courts and commen
tators have credited federalism with advancing a number of benefits,
including the opportunity for citizen involvement, a government more
responsive to its citizens through interstate competition and innova
tion and experimentation in government.141 Proponents of federalism
have also identified a normative function: avoiding overreaching by
the national government by reserving some affairs for state govern
ments.142 When the Supreme Court has rejected national legislation
on federalism grounds, it has responded primarily to this value.143
This Part argues that judicial abstention from RCRA citizen suits
does not advance these values of federalism. Section III.A demon141. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (listing values). Academic dis
cussions of federalism's benefits include Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47
FLA. L. REV. 499, 524-30, 533-39 (1995), and Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 907. This dis
cussion does not exhaust all values claimed on behalf of federalism. For an example of other
suggested benefits, see SAMUEL H. BEER, To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM 386-88 (1993) (discussing values of co=unity, utility, and lib
erty).
142 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).
143. The New York opinion alludes to this focus by noting that the Constitution would
require a vertical separation of powers between the national government and the states even
if "federalism secured no advantages to anyone." 505 U.S. at 157.
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strates that the statutory framework of RCRA explicitly addresses the
instrumentalist benefits of federalism.
Section III.B argues that
constitutional doctrine amply addresses federalism's normative claim
and is compromised by common law additions.
A.

Instrumentalist Values

RCRA already takes into account federalism's claimed benefits of
responsiveness, innovation, and citizen involvement. The statute's
structure of cooperative federalism seeks to build the values of re
sponsiveness and innovation into the waste disposal scheme. RCRA
citizen suits directly involve citizen participation, a value which ab
stention can make no plausible claim to advance.
Acting alone, state and local governments may face heavy pressure
to lower their environmental standards.144 Competition among states
may translate better into a competition for businesses who prefer
minimal environmental regulation than into a contest for the cleanest
waste program.145 The problems of economic competition, along with
externalities created when one state's pollution affects another state's
environment,146 identify the field as one justifying national legislation
in some fashion.147
Supporters of the values of federalism should view cooperative
federal-state statutes such as RCRA as the best type of national legis
lation: the statute aims to preserve some state autonomy rather than
to preempt the field altogether. RCRA facilitates government re
sponsiveness and innovation by encouraging states to operate pro
grams in lieu of its statutory terms,148 an approach which allows state
agencies flexibility in their approaches to solid and hazardous waste
disposal.149 RCRA balances those local advantages against the need
for national minimum standards by eliminating competition based on
safety levels.150 Broadly applied, a body of abstention dismissals dis-

144. See Adam Babich, Symposium, Environmental Federalism: Our Federalism, Our
Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54 MD. L. REv. 1516, 1532, 1537 (1995) (hereinaf
ter "Our Federalism"); Hodas, supra note 38, at 1615-16.
145.

See Hodas, supra note 38.

See Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554, 608-610 {1995).
146.
147.

See id.

148.

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6926 (West 1997).

149. See § 6902(a)(7) (listing objective of federal-state partnership as "giv[ing] a high
priority to assisting and cooperating with States in obtaining full authorization of State pro
grams."); see also Babich, supra note 144, at 1531 ("The 'built-in restraints' protecting the
states' primacy in their traditional domains are reflected in Congress's practice of pursuing
environmental protection . . . through 'programs of cooperative federalism' . . . .").
150. See J. William Futrell, The Administration of Environmental Law, in SUSTAINABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 93, 118 (Celia Campbell-Mohn et al. eds., 1993).
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courages such cooperative arrangements by sending a message to
Congress that federal law preemption is necessary to create enforce
able solid and hazardous waste standards.
Abstention has an even weaker claim regarding the third instru
mentalist value, that of promoting citizen involvement. This value ad
dresses the comparative ease of taking part in a local legislative proc
ess as opposed to a national one.151 To the extent that this assumption
has force, it is inapplicable to the arena of judicial review. When citi
zens have an interest that becomes sufficiently pronounced to bring
suit in a court,152 the jurisdictional grant under RCRA enables them
access to a regulatory process that is no more cumbersome for being
federal rather than state or local. Where federal courts abstain from
such suits, it is hard to imagine how citizen involvement is enhanced:
the plaintiffs cannot bring suit,153 and there is no other group whose
participatory opportunities increase.
RCRA accommodates both the instrumentalist values of federal
ism and the necessity for some national action in order to achieve en
vironmental goals. RCRA explicitly preserves an active role for states
and promotes public participation through citizen suits, the very ave
nue that abstention would obstruct.
B.

Diffusion of Power

Federalism's normative claim of power diffusion between the na
tional and state governments also fails to support an application of ab
stention doctrines. The Supreme Court's evolving federalism juris
prudence has rested mainly on this claim, rejecting federal laws that
require states to enact specific legislation154 or engage the efforts of
state executive officers.155 One might argue that abstention should rest
on this view as well, acting as a weak lower court signal that comple
ments and reinforces the constitutional federalism doctrines. This
view is misguided.
The constitutional analysis developing in the Supreme Court's fed
eralism jurisprudence has foreclosed several avenues through which
Congress can create federal-state partnerships in order to bring about
national, uniform legislation.156 The Court, however, has retained two
important methods as constitutional: conditional grants, where a state

151.

See Rubin & Feeley, supra note 1, at 915.

152. Both the costs of litigation and the federal rules of standing constrain this event.
153.

See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.

154.

See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992).

155.

See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).

156. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 932-33 (holding unconstitutional federal law that en
listed state officials to perform federal administrative functions); New York, 505 U.S. at 188
(holding unconstitutional federal law that "commandeered" state legislatures).

298

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 98:269

must enact particular legislation in return for optional federal fund
ing;157 and conditional preemption, the statutory scheme employed
under RCRA, where a state chooses either to regulate pursuant to
federal guidelines or to allow the federal government to regulate the
field itself.158 Because each of these statutory structures allows state
governments to choose whether or not to participate in the federal
plan,159 the Supreme Court considers them a minimal threat to state
autonomy.160
Abstention from RCRA citizen suits on common law federalism
grounds ignores the balance established by the Supreme Court in the
constitutional arena. In disallowing certain types of federal-state ar
rangements created by Congress, the Court implicitly relied on the
permissibility of other mechanisms as a means for Congress and states
to create cooperative working relationships.161 Lower federal courts
should not understand the Supreme Court's federalism doctrine as a
cry to arms against any intergovernmental cooperation but rather rec
ognize that restrictive rules in some areas are balanced against expan
sive rules in others.162
The growth of constitutional federalism should thus discourage
lower federal courts from abstaining from a suit whose underlying
federal statute passes constitutional muster. Rather than adopting the
position that if a little federalism doctrine is good, even more will be
better, federal courts should take into account the federalism struc-

157. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (allowing Congress to condition
grant of highway funds upon states imposing a specific drinking age limit).
158.
at 145.

See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 763-66 (1982); see also New York, 505 U.S.

159. Some commentators have complained that states are not really free to decline a
conditional grant. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending:
Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. Cr. REV. 85, 119 (discussing, among other theories,
idea that "choices" offered by Congress are illusory). Others dispute the idea that states are
powerless faced with Congressional incentives. See Roderick M. Hills, The Political Econ

omy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 871-91 (1998). Hills argues that states have the ability to
bargain during the legislative process and later during the grant application process, at the
time the federal government decides exactly how the state will be regulated, and by declin
ing a grant when the program would entail special opportunity costs for the state. See id.
160. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). One commentator has
claimed that some provisions of RCRA are unconstitutional as "commandeering" pursuant
to Printz v. United States. See Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The Green Aspects of Printz:
The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 573, 615-16 (1998) (discussing regulation of underground storage tanks).
161.

See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.

162 See Evan Cantinker, Context and Complementarity Within Federalism Doctrines, 22
HARV. J.L. PUB. POL'Y 161, 163-66 (1998). Cantinker advances the theory that courts might
accommodate the enforcement of federal norms and concerns for state dignity across a set of
doctrines rather than within the precise delineation of a single rule. See id.
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tures developed by the Court that already limit and shape congres
sional power over the states.
CONCLUSION

In enacting RCRA, Congress fashioned a comprehensive regula
tory scheme dependant on the interplay among various governmental
actors performing specific roles. When a federal court forgoes juris
diction over a RCRA citizen suit under Burford abstention or primary
jurisdiction, it frustrates the congressional scheme and misapplies
those common law doctrines.
Dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on primary jurisdiction grounds
fail to recognize that the jurisdictional gaps necessary to apply the
doctrine are absent from RCRA. Such dismissals thwart the policy
considerations of uniformity, technical expertise, and fairness to
plaintiffs. The core prerequisites for Burford abstention, distinctively
local law issues and an independent state regulatory process, are
absent from a RCRA citizen suit. A state's provision of a centralized
review process cannot remedy those absences for purposes of applying
Burford. Cases where citizen suits amount to challenges of agency
siting or permitting determinations should be dismissed on statutory,
not Burford, grounds.
While abstention may seem consistent with the new environment
of state-centered federalism, dismissals of RCRA citizen suits on
Burford or primary jurisdiction grounds thwart the values of
federalism claimed by its proponents and discourage the development
of coherent doctrines of constitutional federalism. Given a statute
with sound constitutional footing, federal courts should respect the
roles assigned to them by RCRA's framework and assume jurisdiction
when the law so requires.

